Damiaan Luc van der Werf

Damiaan Luc van der Werf

Cognitivism/Non-Cognitivism About Normative Utterances is a False Dichotomy

A critique of the widespread tacit assumption that cognitivism (‘truth-aptness’) and non-cognitivism about normative utterances are mutually-exclusive models of normative discourse.

Damiaan Luc van der Werf's avatar
Damiaan Luc van der Werf
Nov 16, 2026
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COGNITIVISM/NON-COGNITIVISM ABOUT NORMATIVE UTTERANCES IS A FALSE DICHOTOMY

An essay critiquing the tacit assumption of the mutual-exclusivity of cognitivism and non-cognitivism about normative statements, instead offering a polysemantic account of the significance of such utterances. A PDF edition of the essay is available to subscribers at the bottom of the page.

I: Introduction

In metaethics and the philosophy of language, theories concerning the semantic significance of normative utterances are conventionally classified as either cognitivist or non-cognitivist, dependent on whether or not they understand normative utterances as propositions that are ‘truth-apt’, or capable of being evaluated as true or false. For a normative utterance to be truth-apt entails that it expresses a proposition concerning what obtains; that, for instance, when one asserts that X is wrong, the wrongness of X is something about which a truth-evaluable claim is being made. Non-cognitivist theories, by contrast, understand normative utterances primarily in terms of non-cognitive functions, such as the expression of evaluative attitudes or the prescription of conduct. Emotivism, for instance, understands the utterance X is wrong as expressing the speaker’s disapproval of X, rather than asserting a proposition about its wrongness. Other forms of non-cognitivism, including prescriptivism and contemporary expressivist theories, offer different accounts of the practical, expressive or attitudinal significance of normative discourse.

Cognitivism and non-cognitivism have historically been presented as competing accounts of the semantic character of normative discourse. However, I wish to contest the tacit assumption of their mutual exclusivity, and question whether either class of models provides an exhaustive account of the linguistic functions performed by normative utterances. Instead, I shall argue that normative language accommodates both cognitive and non-cognitive forms of expression, and that the semantic significance of a particular utterance is partly determined by the context and function for which it is employed. The same normative vocabulary may, in one context, communicate a proposition susceptible to rational evaluation and, in another, serve principally to express an evaluative sentiment, prescribe conduct, or perform some other non-cognitive function. Moreover, these functions need not invariably be mutually exclusive within individual utterances. Central to this argument is the observation that the semantic significance of natural language is heterogeneous across a range of conventional contexts of use, or what Ludwig Wittgenstein termed ‘language-games’.

I shall further argue that distinguishing between the sentimental foundations of normative evaluation and the cognitive character of normative reasoning is essential to understanding these different linguistic functions. Crucially, that an evaluative framework may ultimately rest upon sentiments, preferences or adopted axioms does not entail that propositions derived within that framework are themselves merely expressions of sentiment. Conversely, the possibility of rationally derived normative judgements does not preclude the use of identical normative vocabulary to communicate spontaneous emotional attitudes or perform other non-cognitive functions.

The purpose of this essay, therefore, is not to establish foundational objectivity for moral values, nor to defend any particular substantive ethical framework. Rather, it is to examine the semantic plurality of normative language and to argue that neither cognitivism nor non-cognitivism, understood as an exclusive and universally applicable account of normative utterances, adequately captures the diversity of their linguistic use or the psychology of evaluative-judgement formation.

II: Non-Cognitivism and the Expressive and Prescriptive Functions of Normative Language

Non-cognitivism comprises a family of theories which understand normative judgements primarily in terms other than the expression of truth-apt beliefs. Among its historical formulations is emotivism, associated particularly with A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson, which understands moral language primarily in terms of its capacity to express evaluative attitudes rather than to describe independently obtaining moral facts. On such an account, the utterance “X is wrong” need not be understood as an assertion concerning some property of X, but may instead function as an expression of disapprobation towards it.

Other non-cognitivist theories place different emphases upon the functions of normative language. R. M. Hare’s prescriptivism, for instance, understands moral judgements principally in terms of their prescriptive character (that of having the function of directive imperatives), while contemporary expressivist theories, including those associated with Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, offer more sophisticated accounts of the attitudes, commitments and practical stances expressed through normative discourse. Although these approaches differ in important respects, they share a resistance to understanding moral claims as truth-evaluable.

It is important here to distinguish the expression of a sentiment from a proposition about that sentiment. The statement “I disapprove of X” expresses a proposition concerning the speaker’s psychological state, and is therefore itself truth-apt. By contrast, an expression of disapproval need not assert any such proposition. The distinction is analogous to that between asserting that one is experiencing pain and crying out in pain. The former reports an experience; the latter expresses it. Consider, for instance, someone encountering something which produces an immediate and visceral sensation of disgust, and exclaiming, “That’s awful!” In some circumstances, this utterance might serve primarily to communicate the speaker’s emotional reaction. It need not constitute an attempt to establish that the object of disgust possesses some independently demonstrable property of awfulness. Rather, its principal function may be expressive. Normative vocabulary frequently performs precisely this function. Indeed, much of ordinary evaluative discourse consists in the communication of approval, indignation, aversion, enthusiasm or disgust, and such expressions may serve further interpersonal purposes, including encouraging others to adopt similar attitudes or discouraging them from engaging in particular forms of conduct.

Likewise, normative utterances may function prescriptively, directing or encouraging conduct without necessarily asserting a proposition about some independently obtaining normative fact. For instance, the exclamation “That’s utterly wrong!” can be understood as a form of communicating an imperative: “Don’t do that!” The expressive and prescriptive functions of normative language may also overlap, such as when an expression of disgust also serves to discourage some action.

Nevertheless, the existence of such linguistic practices does not establish that all normative discourse is fundamentally non-cognitive. To infer from the fact that normative language can express attitudes or prescribe conduct that its semantic function must invariably be non-cognitive would be to mistake certain applications of linguistic expressions for their exhaustive meaning.

III: Cognitivism and the Propositional Function of Normative Language

For cognitivism to be true of some normative utterance, it must at the very least be the case that the utterance expresses a proposition capable of being true or false. Importantly, this does not entail a commitment to moral realism, or to the existence of universally binding, unconditionally obligatory moral facts. One may hold that normative propositions are truth-apt while remaining agnostic about whether any such propositions are ultimately true independently of human evaluative commitments.

One way in which normative discourse acquires an evidently cognitive character is through reasoning within frameworks that follow from certain accepted premises or axioms. Consider the comparatively straightforward case of instrumental reasoning. Suppose that an individual wishes to reach a particular destination in the shortest possible time. Given this objective, there may be an objectively determinable route which best accomplishes it. The individual’s preference for reaching the destination quickly might be entirely subjective, but it does not follow that the question of which route best satisfies that preference is similarly subjective.

One might consequently assert that the individual ought to take a particular route, and that it would be wrong to take another one, where the normative significance of the utterance is conditional upon an accepted objective. Provided that the relevant practical principle is accepted, the conclusion can be assessed rationally by reference to facts concerning the available routes and their respective durations; if one in fact desires to navigate to one’s destination as fast as possible, then it follows that it would be right or wrong to take one or another route.

The same general structure is apparent in more substantive normative discourse. Suppose that two interlocutors accept the premise that unnecessary suffering ought to be avoided, other things being equal. They might subsequently disagree about the moral permissibility of a particular action or public policy. Yet insofar as their disagreement concerns whether that action satisfies or violates the principle they have jointly accepted, their disagreement is not reducible to the mere expression of competing sentiments. It concerns a proposition whose truth can be investigated relative to the premises governing their normative framework.

Crucially, the fact that the framework’s foundational commitments may themselves originate in sentiment does not render every conclusion derived within it non-cognitive. The origin of a normative premise and the semantic character of an utterance expressing a conclusion derived from that premise are distinct matters.

Indeed, this distinction helps explain why normative reasoning can sometimes produce conclusions which contradict our immediate emotional dispositions. An individual might experience a spontaneous aversion towards some action while nevertheless concluding, upon deliberation, that it is permissible or even obligatory according to principles they accept. Their emotional reaction and their considered normative judgement need not coincide.

Much ordinary moral discourse also operates upon an implicit presupposition of shared evaluative commitments. When one declares that a particular action is wrong, one often implicitly assumes that one’s interlocutor already accepts certain relevant principles. Consequently, it is seldom necessary to articulate the complete normative framework from which a judgement has been derived. The statement functions as a condensed expression of a conclusion whose underlying premises are tacitly understood.

This phenomenon is particularly apparent in political discourse, where disagreements concerning the moral permissibility or desirability of particular policies frequently proceed from an implicit assumption of shared normative commitments. One interlocutor might, for instance, seek to demonstrate that a proposed policy is wrong by showing that it would produce unnecessary suffering, or otherwise result in consequences which the other interlocutor already regards as impermissible. In such circumstances, the disagreement concerns whether the policy in question satisfies or violates principles to which both parties are already committed. The truth or falsity of the resulting normative conclusion may therefore be established, conditional upon those principles, through empirical investigation and rational argumentation.

However, political disagreements do not invariably proceed from shared evaluative premises. Where the interlocutors disagree concerning the principles themselves, the discussion must instead interrogate more foundational normative commitments. Disagreements of this kind may concern, for instance, the relative importance of equality and liberty, the admissibility of particular forms of harm, or competing conceptions of justice. Political discourse thus frequently operates at two distinct, though often overlapping, levels: disagreements concerning the instrumental efficacy or normative permissibility of particular policies given certain accepted principles, and more fundamental disagreements concerning which principles ought to be accepted in the first place.

The distinction is significant because it illustrates how normative language can communicate propositions susceptible to rational evaluation without requiring that the foundational axioms from which those propositions proceed possess unconditional normative authority. It also explains why some normative disagreements may be resolved through the establishment of empirical facts or the demonstration of logical consequences, whereas others persist because the interlocutors do not share the evaluative premises necessary for possible agreement.

Of course, the possibility of rationally disputing conclusions within an accepted normative framework does not, by itself, establish the unconditional authority of that framework. Nor does disagreement concerning foundational axioms necessarily place them beyond rational scrutiny. Nevertheless, these considerations do not compromise the central point: that normative utterances can express truth-apt propositions whose evaluation proceeds through recognisably cognitive processes, even where the foundations of the normative frameworks within which they occur remain conditional upon prior evaluative commitments.

IV: Wittgenstein, Language-Games and the Contextual Significance of Normative Utterances

The preceding discussion establishes that normative language can plausibly perform expressive, prescriptive and propositional functions. The question then arises whether these different functions must be accommodated within a single, invariant semantic account of normative vocabulary, or whether their significance may vary according to the particular contexts in which they are employed.

Here, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language offers a useful theoretical framework. His notion of a ‘language-game’ captures the relationship between linguistic expressions and the conventional contexts within which they acquire their significance. Language is employed not merely to describe states of affairs, but also to command, persuade, question, joke, express emotion, establish conventions, and perform innumerable other activities: one ‘plays’ the language game of fact-stating, emotional expression, sarcasm and so forth.

Consider the expression “That was wrong”. In one context, the utterance might constitute a considered judgement concerning an action’s conformity to an accepted normative principle. In another, it might be an immediate expression of indignation, functioning primarily to communicate the speaker’s disapproval. In yet another, it might be uttered playfully, sarcastically or theatrically, without any serious intention of asserting a normative proposition.

What distinguishes these uses is not necessarily their vocabulary or grammatical construction, but the particular linguistic activity in which the speaker is participating. This observation raises a difficulty for attempts to assign normative expressions a universally cognitive or non-cognitive interpretation. If linguistic meaning is partly constituted by contextually established practices of use, then the semantic significance of normative vocabulary cannot simply be inferred from the presence of terms such as good, bad, right or wrong. One must instead examine the function being performed by the utterance in question.

The heterogeneity of normative language may therefore be understood not as warranting reconciliation with one universally explanatory semantic theory, but as a natural consequence of the multiplicity of activities which human language accommodates.

V: The Humorous Conflation of the Emotive and the Cognitive

An especially illustrative example of the distinction between expressive and propositional uses of normative language occurs in ordinary humour. Consider someone who strongly dislikes pineapple on pizza and jokingly declares:

“It is wrong to put pineapple on pizza!”

The humour of the utterance depends, at least in part, upon the incongruity between the speaker’s subjective aversion and the apparent assertion of an authoritative moral judgement. The speaker is effectively presenting a personal preference as though it constituted a normatively binding proposition.

What makes this humorous is precisely that the interlocutor recognises the disproportion between the sentiment being expressed and the normative factuality apparently being claimed. In ordinary circumstances, the speaker is not attempting to demonstrate that pineapple on pizza violates some accepted moral principle. Rather, the utterance dramatises a subjective distaste by appropriating the vocabulary and rhetorical conventions of serious moral discourse. The joke therefore trades upon a distinction between two recognisable functions of normative language: the expression of an evaluative sentiment and the assertion of a proposition concerning what ought or ought not to be done. Indeed, if the audience were incapable of recognising this distinction, the utterance would lose much of its humorous significance. One must understand that the speaker’s aversion does not, merely by being expressed, establish or even refer to an authoritative moral conclusion.

The example is particularly instructive because the same grammatical construction can be employed in entirely serious contexts. The words “It is wrong to do X” may express a considered normative conclusion, a spontaneous emotional reaction, or a deliberately exaggerated conflation of the two. It furthermore illustrates that competent speakers self-consciously recognise and exploit differences between the functions performed by normative expressions, and our ability to see the humour in the joke is conditional precisely on our recognition of the different semantic modalities for which the very same normative lexicon is employed.

VI: Dual-Process Psychology and Normative Judgement

The preceding discussion has sought to establish that normative language accommodates both cognitive and non-cognitive functions, and that the significance of a particular utterance may vary according to its context of use. Here we shall submit that this linguistic plurality is paralleled by a plurality—or at least, duality—of cognitive processes that underpin the formation of evaluative judgements, and that the polysemic nature of normative utterances in part arises from the fact that a shared lexicon is deployed to express normative judgements arrived at by this plurality of processes.

In cognitive psychology, dual-process theories distinguish, broadly speaking, between relatively immediate, automatic and affectively influenced processes of judgement formation and slower, more deliberative processes involving conscious reflection, reasoning and cognitive control. Although these distinctions should not be understood as reflective of two cleanly bifurcated or mutually exclusive psychological systems, they provide a useful framework for understanding the different capacities through which human beings arrive at evaluative judgements.

These distinctions have been investigated empirically in moral psychology. For instance, Joshua Greene et al. (2001) employed functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural processes implicated in responses to moral dilemmas, finding that different kinds of moral dilemmas engage emotional processing to differing degrees, and that such differences may influence the judgements participants produce. In a subsequent study, Greene et al. (2008) found that imposing an additional cognitive load selectively increased the time required to make certain consequentialist judgements, suggesting that deliberative cognitive processes contribute to at least some forms of moral evaluation.

Similarly, Paul Slovic (2007) demonstrated a pronounced distinction between the kinds of evaluative judgements we arrive at via quick, affective emotional judgement formation and slower, more deliberative evaluative reasoning. Research reviewed by Slovic showed that upon initial evaluation, groups of participants display greater levels of concern and charity toward a single victimised individual than they do for large numbers of victims. However, Small, Loewenstein and Slovic (2007) found that explaining this discrepancy reduced donations to identifiable victims without increasing donations to statistical victims, illustrating our capacity to revise our initial affective responses through deliberative reflection.

Further evidence for the influence of deliberative reasoning upon moral judgement was presented by Paxton, Ungar and Greene (2012). Across a series of experiments, they similarly found that encouraging reflection could influence participants’ moral evaluations. Notably, when participants were presented with arguments challenging an initially objectionable course of conduct, stronger arguments proved more persuasive than weaker ones under conditions permitting greater deliberation.

The aforesaid examples are just a selection of those from the extensive literature in moral psychology and merely serve to illustrate the relevant observation that human evaluative capacities encompass both the immediate formation of affective attitudes and the deliberate assessment of conduct according to principles, evidence and rational inference. An individual may experience a spontaneous sentiment of disapproval towards some action, yet subsequently arrive at a considered judgement which contradicts that initial disposition. Conversely, an initially reasoned evaluation may itself produce or modify the individual’s emotional attitudes.

These capacities are implicated in the different functions performed by normative language. A speaker who exclaims that something is wrong may be expressing an immediate evaluative sentiment, whereas another employing precisely the same expression may be communicating the conclusion of an extended process of rational deliberation. Moreover, the two capacities may operate in conjunction, such that an utterance may simultaneously communicate a considered normative judgement and express the speaker’s affective disposition towards its subject.

The coexistence and interaction of these different evaluative capacities help to explain why normative language may be employed in such varied ways. The same linguistic resources can serve to communicate the products of affective evaluation, rational deliberation, or some combination thereof. The diversity of psychological processes implicated in normative judgement thus provides an additional consideration in favour of examining normative discourse as a plurality of contextually situated linguistic practices, rather than presupposing that all such discourse must instantiate a single semantic modality.

VII: Conclusion

The traditional distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism identifies two important dimensions of normative language: its capacity to communicate truth-apt propositions and its capacity to perform non-cognitive functions, including the expression of evaluative attitudes and the prescription of conduct. However, the existence of these different functions does not establish that either furnishes an exhaustive account of normative discourse.

Normative expressions are employed across a multiplicity of linguistic contexts, and their significance cannot always be determined independently of the language-game in which they occur. In some circumstances, an assertion that something is wrong functions principally as an expression of disapproval or a prescription concerning conduct. In others, it communicates a proposition rationally derivable from accepted normative premises. As we have seen, in still others, it may humorously and self- consciously appropriate the lexicon of considered and truth-apt evaluation for the purpose of expressing one’s revulsion.

The psychological processes implicated in normative judgement formation provide a further dimension to this account. Human beings possess capacities for both immediate affective evaluation and more deliberative forms of reasoning, which may operate independently or in conjunction. Although the psychological origins of an utterance do not determine its semantic character, the interaction of these capacities helps illuminate the diversity of functions performed by normative language. A context-sensitive understanding of normative language, informed by Wittgenstein’s conception of language-games, consequently provides grounds for questioning the universality of the traditional cognitivist/non-cognitivist opposition. The same normative vocabulary may participate in different kinds of linguistic activity, and a satisfactory account of its meaning must be capable of accommodating this diversity.

The conclusion is therefore not that cognitivism and non-cognitivism are individually mistaken, but that neither should be assumed to characterise normative discourse in its entirety. Both identify legitimate possibilities within a linguistically heterogeneous domain. The purported dichotomy is thus false insofar as it demands an exclusive and universally applicable classification of normative utterances where a plurality of semantic functions may instead obtain.

Bibliography

Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105–2108. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1062872

Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144–1154. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004

Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment. Cognitive Science, 36(1), 163–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01210.x

Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95. https://sjdm.org/~baron/journal/7303a/jdm7303a.htm

Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., & Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102, 143–153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.005

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